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ALIENATING THE UNALIENABLE: EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
VALLEY PARK, MISSOURI’S ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
ORDINANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Mayor Jeffrey Whitteaker turned up his radio as he cruised down Highway 
30 in his American-made pick-up.  A radio report caught his ear.  It described a 
rousing controversy over a municipal ordinance recently passed in the small 
town of Hazelton, Pennsylvania.1  Hazelton’s City Council had enacted an 
ordinance that cracked down on the “illegal immigrant” residents.  Whitteaker, 
impressed by the concept, proposed such an ordinance to his city’s attorney at 
the next Board of Alderman meeting. 
On July 17, 2006, Valley Park, Missouri, a small, sleepy, predominantly 
White suburban community which had not experienced an influx of illegal 
immigration within its city limits, adopted Ordinance No. 1708, “An 
Ordinance Relating to Illegal Immigration Within the City of Valley Park, 
Mo,” without a dissenting vote.2  As Whitteaker had envisioned, the ordinance 
was a copycat piece of legislation which employed the same language as the 
Hazelton ordinance.3  When ABC News asked why his city would enact such 
legislation, Whitteaker replied, “[y]ou wouldn’t change your motor oil after 
your engine blew up,” and described the ordinance as “preventative 
maintenance,” a means of “protecting [his] community from the social ills of 
illegal immigration.”4  Despite Valley Park officials’ express sentiments that 
the “illegal aliens” could soon “overrun” their community, U.S. Census 
statistics do not indicate that Valley Park is a community in which a White 
 
  1. Stephen Deere, Law puts Valley Park Landlords in a bind, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Aug. 13, 2006, at A1. 
 2. VALLEY PARK, MO., Ordinance No. 1708, An Ordinance Relating to Illegal Immigration 
Within the City of Valley Park, Missouri, (July 17, 2006), available at http://www.valley 
parkmo.org/docs/Ordinance%201708.pdf. 
 3. HAZELTON, PA., Illegal Immigration Relief Act (July 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.hazletoncity.org/2006_16_Illegal_Alien_Immigration_Relief_Act_Ordinance_Amen
ded.pdf. 
 4. ABC Nightly News (ABC television broadcast Sept. 25, 2006); see also Stephen Deere, 
Valley Park Follows Lead on Illegal Alien Law. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 2006, at 
B1. 
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majority is scrambling to conserve its resources against a rapidly growing 
minority or immigrant, undocumented or documented, population.5 
In haste or perhaps out of spite, the Valley Park Board of Alderman failed 
to allow for a buffer period before enforcement of the ordinance began.  Local 
police began knocking on apartment doors immediately.6  According to Hector 
Molina of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, twenty Valley Park families packed up 
their belongings and fled their Valley Park residences in the middle of the 
night.  The families pulled their children from Valley Park schools and 
struggled for weeks to keep a roof over their head; Molina reports that they 
remain dependant on the charity of others in the St. Louis community.7 
Beginning in Summer 2006 and continuing through Winter 2007, fifty-
seven municipalities in seventeen states have considered or are considering 
municipal ordinances similar to that of Valley Park.8  Ten municipalities have 
adopted “anti-illegal immigrant” ordinances.9  And, although some of the 
ordinances call for a variety of measures, some more aggressive than others, all 
of the ordinances include these basic provisions: (1) prohibiting illegal aliens 
from renting in their jurisdictions, (2) imposing civil and monetary penalties on 
landlords who rent to “illegal immigrants,” (3) fining, and denying business 
permits, city contracts or grants to, employers who hire “illegal immigrants” 
and to any person or entity who has “aided or abetted” an “illegal immigrant” 
within the United States, and (4) defining English as the official local 
language.10  More alarmingly, in late January 2007, the Missouri State Senate 
debated Senate Bill 348 which proposes state legislation that would include 
 
 5. Hector Molina, Hispanic Outreach Director, St. Louis Archdiocese, Address at the 
Hispanic Leaders Group of Greater St. Louis (Oct. 11, 2006); see Missouri Census Data Center, 
available at http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/trends/estimates.shtml; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VALLEY 
PARK, MISSOURI PROFILE OF SELECTED SOCIAL STATISTICS, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ 
QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=16000US2975472&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_DP2&-
ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-_sse=on.  Valley Park has 6,518 residents, ninety 
percent of whom are white.  Valley Park has only 148 Hispanic residents (2.3% percent) and, as 
estimated, less than 1 percent of the Hispanic residents are undocumented, in other words about 
two residents are illegally present in the United States, as defined by federal law.  Valley Park has 
407 (6.2%) foreign born residents, 64 were born in Latin America, 254 born in Asia.  Id. 
 6. Complaint at 6, Reynolds v. Valley Park, St. Louis County Circuit Court, Div. 13, Cause 
No. 06-CC-3908. 
 7. Molina, supra note 5. 
 8. LATINO JUSTICE PROJECT, PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, 
MUNICIPALITIES CONSIDERING ‘ANTI-ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES,’ available at 
http://prldef.org/Civil/Latino%20Justice%20Campaign.htm 
 9. Id. 
 10. See VALLEY PARK, MO. ORDINANCE NO. 1708, supra note 2; see also HAZELTON, PA., 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (July 16, 2006), available at http://www.hazletoncity.org/ 
2006_16_Illegal_Alien_Immigration_Relief_Act_Ordinance_Amended.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] ALIENATING THE UNALIENABLE 1319 
several of the provisions set forth in the local “illegal immigration” 
ordinances.11 
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the socio-political and 
jurisprudential backdrop to this recent wave of local ordinances that address 
“illegal” immigration.  First, it points out various social and political trends 
that may have been the impetus of such local measures and outlines the 
relevant legal precedent relating to governmental classifications based on 
alienage, documented and undocumented, and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Drawing on the analysis set forth in the cases 
discussed in Part I, Part II of this Comment calls for strict judicial scrutiny in 
the Court’s Equal Protection analysis if and when the question of 
constitutionality of local “illegal immigration” ordinances arises.12  Part II also 
suggests that Valley Park and other local governments will fail to provide a 
compelling state interest to justify their discriminatory classification based on 
undocumented alienage, and thus, urges the Court to find that Valley Park’s 
“illegal immigration” ordinance violates undocumented immigrants’ right to 
equal protection of the law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. National Socio-Political Backdrop 
The events of 9/11 increased national economic, social and political 
tensions and served to renew a long-standing national debate on the status of 
all non-citizens generally, and the rights and obligations of undocumented 
aliens more specifically.  United States immigration law underwent rapid 
changes in its scope and enforcement.  Symbolizing this change in the focus of 
immigration regulation from economic control to national security, the 
enforcement wing of the Immigration and Naturalization Services became the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2002, a sub-entity of the 
 
 11. Like the Valley Park ordinance, Missouri Senate Bill No. 348 includes provisions that 
would prohibit landlords from renting to “illegal immigrants” and would deny state business 
permits and project grants to employers who knowingly hire “illegal immigrants.”  Furthermore, 
proponents of the bill have also proposed “English Only” provisions to the legislation.  S.B. 348, 
94th Leg., (Mo. 2007), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/07info/BTS_Web/ 
Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=6818. 
 12. In September 2006, the Valley Park ordinances were temporarily enjoined from 
enforcement.  Two small business owners, the Missouri Equal Housing Opportunity Counsel, 
Washington University School of Law Clinic, and the Saint Louis University Legal Clinic filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, and the case had a trial date of March 2–3, 
2007, however the City decided to forgo the expense of litigation and repealed the legislation.  
Reynolds, et al. v. City of Valley Park, et al., St. Louis Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 
Division 13, Cause No. 06-CC-3802 (September 25, 2006). 
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Department of Homeland Security.13  Since 1980, lax enforcement of federal 
immigration law and economic growth has brought an estimated 7 million to 
20 million undocumented immigrants to the U.S.14 
Because of the nature of these immigrants’ entry and residence in the 
United States, not much demographic or reliable empirical data exists to 
illustrate the effects of this influx.  In the absence of accurate and reliable 
information, misconceptions, prejudice, and spirited controversy regarding the 
economic, social and demographic impact of undocumented workers prevail.15  
In contrast to the first two centuries of American immigration, most 
immigrants to the United States over the last two decades come from non-
European countries, predominantly from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.16 
Comprehensive immigration reform has been a prominent issue in national 
political discourse for nearly five years.  President Bush championed 
immigration reform for many years.17  On May 15, 2006, the President 
addressed the nation from the Oval Office and spent thirty minutes of prime-
time television promoting his plan for immigration reform, what he described 
as a matter of “great national importance.”18  Similarly, in August 2006, 
President Bush focused his weekend National Radio Address on national 
immigration issues, again pushing his agenda for comprehensive reform.19  
Despite all this talk, the federal government has failed to adopt immigration 
reform.  In 2005 and 2006, the 109th Congress spent weeks debating the 
immigration issue and proposing various plans for reform.  And yet, at the 
close of the winter session, Congress had reached stalemate, and in effect, 
passed nothing relating to immigration reform.20 
 
 13. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 14. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION (March 31, 2005). 
 15. FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM (FAIR), “What’s Wrong with 
Illegal Immigration?” available at www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigration 
issuecenters7443 (indicating that illegal immigration drains taxpayer resources and has a negative 
effect on the “American worker”); cf. George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits of Immigration, 
9:2 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3 (1995); Eric S. Rothman & Thomas J. 
Espenshalle, Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented Immigration in the United States, 58:3 
POPULATION INDEX 381, 410 (1992). 
 16. See PASSEL, supra note 14. 
 17. Press Release White House, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform (Jan. 07, 
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html. 
 18. Press Release, White House, President’s Radio Address (Aug. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060805.html; Press Release, White House, 
President Bush Addresses the Nation on Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-8.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Notably, in an extraordinary session, Congress passed legislation that allocates funds to 
construct a border wall.  The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367 (2006). 
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Amidst the federal debate, one proposed strategy for reform promoted 
local enforcement of federal immigration laws.  In June 2002, nine months 
after September 11th, Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed that the federal 
government authorized state and local law enforcement officers to enforce 
federal immigration laws.21  Courts have held that criminal violations of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) fall within state police powers; 
however, in order to enforce such violations, a local police officer must first 
distinguish between criminal and civil violations of the INA, a highly 
complicated task.22  Furthermore, the Circuits are split as to whether local 
police enforcement of civil provisions of the INA preempted by federal law.23  
Adding fuel to the local action fire, bills such as the Clear Law Enforcement 
for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act) 24 and its Senate counterpart, 
the Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) proposed federal legislation 
to empower and strongly encourage states to employ state and local police to 
enforce civil immigration law.  Even though these bills failed to garner enough 
congressional support to become law, they contributed to the trend; it was en 
vogue to crackdown on the “illegals” at the local level. 
Failure to enforce and reform federal immigration law, coupled with a 
trend toward national initiatives for local enforcement, contributed to the birth 
of “illegal immigration” ordinances at the local level.  Inaction in Washington 
frustrated Americans from both sides of the aisle, as the immigration debate 
seemed endless while the population of undocumented immigrants steadily 
grew.25  Federal immigration regulations seemed to lag several years, perhaps 
more than a decade, behind the social trend.  The perception that Congress was 
shirking its responsibility for border control and immigration regulation 
fomented frustration at the local level.  In the name of fervent patriotism and 
 
 21. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Prepared Remarks on the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/ 
060502agpreparedremarks.htm. 
 22. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Michael M. Hethmon, 
The Chimera and The Cop: Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 8 U.D.C.L. REV. 83, 
84 (2004). 
 23. Gonzales, 722 F.2d 468; see Jill Keblawi, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent 
Authority or Inherently Pre-empted, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 817, 833–836 (2004); cf. United 
States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 24. The CLEAR Act, represents a move towards local enforcement of national immigration 
efforts.  H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).  It is an example of harsh measures proposed in 
Congress, in the name of “Homeland Security” and immigration enforcement.  H.R. 2671, Cong. 
108th (2003).  For the first time in American history, this bill makes it a federal crime, instead of 
merely a civil offense, to be in the United States in violation of an immigration law or regulation.  
This provision could turn millions of immigrants currently in the U.S. into criminals, creating a 
significant hurdle in their efforts to acquire any legal status—and would effectively frustrate the 
proposals that would provide real immigration reform. 
 25. See PASSEL, supra note 14. 
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riding a wave of popularity, local governments dove into the arena of 
immigration regulation.  Many proponents believed that local ordinances, such 
as Valley Park’s, presented an effective way to send a message to 
Washington.26 
B. The Judicial Precedent: Undocumented Aliens and Equal Protection 
1. Equal Protection and State Discrimination Based on Alienage 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of state discrimination against 
“documented” alienage offers the background upon which this Comment will 
consider the Valley Park and other local “illegal immigration” ordinances.  In 
its alienage cases, the Court indicates that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment extends to aliens.  And, because aliens are a discrete 
and insular minority, which has been the subject of nativist animus throughout 
our Nation’s history, state and local legislative classifications based on 
alienage warrant strict judicial scrutiny. 
a. Chinese Exclusion and Fourteenth Amendment Protection: Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins 
In 1886, the Court established that aliens are protected against 
discrimination under the explicit mandate of the Equal Protection Clause 
which provides that no “person” shall be denied equal protection of the law.27  
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Chinese permanent residents of California challenged 
the constitutionality of San Francisco ordinances that regulated the 
construction and conduct of laundry houses in the city.28  Under the guise of 
the facially neutral ordinances, city officials arbitrarily denied licenses to 
Chinese laundry house proprietors.  The Court explained, “[t]he fourteenth 
amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”29  
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are “universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction” of the State.30  The 
Court concluded that the San Francisco municipal authority had applied and 
administered the ordinances with “an evil eye and an unequal hand,” 
discriminating based on “hostility to the race and nationality” of the Chinese 
immigrants, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31 
 
 26. See Allison Retka, Missouri’s Valley Park begins its defense in barring the hiring and 
renting to illegal immigrants, ST. LOUIS COUNTIAN, Oct. 11, 2006. 
 27. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 369. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 373–74. 
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b. Racial Animus and Classifications based on Alienage: Takahashi v. 
Fish and Game Commission 
In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the Court affirmed its 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment in Yick Wo: the Equal Protection 
Clause protected resident aliens against state laws which discriminated by 
imposing unequal burdens on aliens in the administration of local commerce.32  
In 1945, the California Fish and Game Commission banned the issuance of 
commercial fishing licenses to any “person ineligible to citizenship,” a 
classification that included primarily Japanese residents.33  In its analysis of the 
California Fish and Game Code provision, the Court commented that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that state laws imposing discriminatory 
burdens upon alien residents must be confined within narrow limits.  The Court 
held that California’s alleged “special interest” in conserving its natural 
resources was inadequate to justify the exclusion of all aliens who are lawful 
residents of the state from making a living by fishing off the California 
shores.34 
Notably, in concurrence, Justice Murphy pointed out that the majority 
failed to adequately examine the “anti-Japanese fever” manifested in the 
legislation.35  Justice Murphy wrote, “Legislation [designed solely to 
discriminate based on nationality] is not entitled to wear the cloak of 
constitutionality.”36  After describing racial and economic tension that 
characterized World War II and post-war anti-Japanese sentiment in the United 
States, Justice Murphy criticized the California provisions as the product of the 
“winds of racial animosity” and noted that the provisions demonstrated an 
“obvious . . . attempt to legalize discrimination against Japanese 
alien[s] . . . .”37  Murphy concluded, “We need but unbutton the seemingly 
innocent words of [the California Fish and Game Code provision] to discover 
beneath them the very negation of all the ideals of the equal protection 
clause.”38 
c. Emergence of Strict Scrutiny for Classifications Based on Alienage 
In Graham v. Richardson in 1971, the Court ruled that state legislative 
classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close 
 
 32. 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). 
 33. Id. at 414. 
 34. Id. at 421. 
 35. Id. at 422 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 425–26. 
 38. Id. at 427 (Murphy, J., concurring).  Justice Murphy expressed similar concerns in his 
dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945) (“Such exclusion goes over ‘the very 
brink of constitutional power’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”). 
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judicial scrutiny.”39  Employing a strict scrutiny standard, the Court struck 
down a Pennsylvania law that made non-citizens ineligible to receive public 
assistance and an Arizona law that placed a fifteen-year residency requirement 
on the receipt of public benefits.40  The Court noted that Takahashi had 
indicated that “a State’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own 
citizens is inadequate” to justify discrimination against resident aliens.41  
Aliens are a “prime example of a discrete and insular minority” for whom 
heightened judicial review is appropriate.42  In support of its strict scrutiny 
standard, the Court pointed out that aliens work in the state and contribute to 
its economic growth, and yet they exercise no right to vote.43  Moreover, the 
Court reasoned that its decision to subject state and local legislation that denies 
aliens equal rights to strict scrutiny had a second constitutional underpinning.  
It pointed to the federal government’s primary and plenary responsibility in the 
field of immigration and naturalization, grounded in the Supremacy Clause44 
and the Naturalization power.45 
Since Graham, the Court has repeatedly applied a strict standard of review 
to state and local legislative classifications based on alienage.  In Sugarman v. 
Dougall, the Court declared unconstitutional a New York law that prohibited 
aliens from obtaining civil service jobs.46  Likewise, in Nyquist v. Mauclet, a 
New York statute, which limited financial aid in higher education to citizens 
and those who declared their intent to become citizens, failed to survive the 
Court’s highest scrutiny.47  Although strict scrutiny is the general rule when a 
state or local government discriminates against aliens, the Court has carved a 
narrow exception for state statutes that “confine the performance of . . . 
important public responsibility[ies] to [citizens of the United States].”48 
Against this backdrop of equal protection jurisprudence which subjects 
sub-federal legislation that discriminates against “documented” aliens with 
strict scrutiny, the Court heard its first case in which undocumented aliens 
asserted their right to equal protection of the law. 
 
 39. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 374. 
 42. Id. at 372. 
 43. Id. at 376. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 46. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
 47. 432 U.S. 572 (1976). 
 48. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (required citizenship in order to be a police 
officer); see, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a state statute requiring 
citizenship in order to be an elementary or secondary school teacher); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 
454 U.S. 432 (1982)(citizenship in order to be a probation officer); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN 
ATTANAISO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 856–63 (4th ed. 2002). 
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2. Equal Protection and State Discrimination against Undocumented 
Aliens 
a. Plyler v. Doe: The Court Sets Forth an Intermediate Scrutiny Standard 
In 1982, an influx of undocumented immigrants presented a 
socioeconomic challenge similar to the circumstances giving rise to debate in 
our nation today.49  In this context, the Court decided Plyler v. Doe and 
employed intermediate scrutiny in examining a Texas statute that required 
undocumented aliens pay for elementary public schools.50  The Plyler Court 
declared the Texas statute unconstitutional and affirmed the broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as 
established in Yick Wo.  In its efforts to defend the statute, Texas argued that 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, unlike the Due Process 
Clause, directs a state to protect persons “within its jurisdiction.”51  Citing Yick 
Wo,52 the Court dismissed such a limitation on the scope of equal protection 
and explained that the phrase “within its jurisdiction” does not distract from, 
but confirms, the understanding that “the Fourteenth Amendment extends to 
anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches 
into every corner of a State’s territory.”53  Justice Brennan, writing for a 
majority joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Powell, 
emphasized that “[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is 
unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of 
law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”54 
Although the Court never expressly identified its method of review as an 
application of an intermediate scrutiny standard, the majority placed the burden 
of proof of the statute’s constitutional validity upon Texas to provide a 
“substantial state interest” to justify its denial of equal rights to undocumented 
aliens.  Moreover, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion pointed out “[o]ur 
review in a case such as these is properly heightened,” and he cited Craig v. 
Boren,55 a case in which the Supreme Court articulated a standard of 
intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications.56 
 
 49. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 243, n.2 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that 
estimates of the number of immigrants illegal present in the United States ranged between 3 and 
12 million). 
 50. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 51. Id. at 211. 
 52. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 53. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. 
 54. Id. at 210. 
 55. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 56. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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In support of its heightened level of scrutiny, the Court in Plyler 
emphasized the isolated nature of the undocumented immigrant population in 
the United States.  Justice Brennan pointed out that due to the lax enforcement 
of the federal laws barring entry and employment of undocumented aliens, a 
substantial “shadow population,” numbering in the millions, existed within the 
United States’ borders in the early 1980s.57  The Court acknowledged that 
“[t]he existence of such an underclass presents a most difficult problem for a 
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under the law.”58  
The Court expressly rejected Texas’s argument that the statute should only be 
subject to rational basis review, requiring the State to provide some 
“substantial state interest” furthered by such a classification.59  At the same 
time, the majority refused to treat undocumented aliens as a suspect class, 
commenting that undocumented status was not a “constitutional irrelevancy,” 
and thus, refusing to apply strict scrutiny in reviewing the Texas statute.60  The 
Court pointed out that undocumented status was not an immutable 
characteristic, more pointedly, the result a decision to engage in unlawful 
action.61 
Yet another rationale to support heightened judicial scrutiny employed in 
Plyler was the importance of the “fundamental right” to education.  Even 
though education may not qualify as a “right” granted by the Constitution, the 
Court noted that it is not merely “some governmental ‘benefit’ 
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”62  The Court 
pointed out, “it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the 
creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom 
will remain in the State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and 
National Government attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime.”63  
Justice Marshall’s concise concurrence emphasized his argument for the 
protection of what he described as a “fundamental right to education” as he 
first articulated in San Antonio v. Rodriguez.64  More generally, the Court’s 
analysis focused on the effect that the Texas statute had on the undocumented 
immigrant children, “special members of this underclass,” noting that the 
children’s unlawful presence in the United States was not a product of their 
own conduct, but rather the conduct of their parents.65 
 
 57. Id. at 218. 
 58. Id. at 219. 
 59. Id. at 230. 
 60. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 61. Id. at 220. 
 62. Id. at 221. 
 63. Id. at 241. 
 64. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973)). 
 65. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219–20. 
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In Plyler, the Court failed to discuss prejudicial and discriminatory practice 
based on race or national origin as an underlying impetus for the Texas statute.  
Nearly 80 percent of undocumented residents in Texas in 1980 were 
Mexican.66  Unlike the Court in Yick Wo or in Takahashi, the Court in Plyler 
never alluded to anti-Latino or nativist sentiment as a subtext to local 
legislative classifications based on alienage.  Rather, the Plyler Court 
presented an economic, class-based rationale for its decision to strike down the 
statute.  The Court scrutinized the Texas statute because it presented the 
specter of creating “a permanent underclass.”67 
In defense of the statute, the Court discerned several colorable state 
interests that the discriminatory classification allegedly furthered.68  First, the 
State suggested that it enacted the statute to protect itself against the influx of 
“illegal entrants” that places a burden on the State’s limited resources.69  The 
Court disparaged this argument and pointed out that evidence suggests that 
“illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the 
local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”70  Next, Texas argued that its 
statute protected the interest of state residents when it withheld the benefits of 
public education from undocumented aliens, whose presence within the United 
States is the product of unlawful conduct.71  Texas suggested that Congress’s 
apparent disapproval of the presence of undocumented aliens in the United 
States and the aliens’ evasion of federal regulation provide Texas authority to 
impose “special disabilities” upon undocumented immigrants.72  The Court 
also refused to impute to Congress an intention to allow a state to withhold 
education from undocumented children, suggesting that there was no national 
policy to support the State in denying elementary education.73  Finally, citing 
Graham, the Court held that a concern for the preservation of state resources 
cannot justify the discriminatory classification used in allocating those 
resources.74 
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, argued that courts should apply a rational 
basis test when reviewing state or local action that affected undocumented 
 
 66. See Jeffrey S. Passel & Karen A. Woodrow, Population Division of the U.S. Census 
Bureau, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: Estimates of Undocumented 
Aliens Counted in 1980, 18:3 INT’L IMMIG. REV. 642, 649 (1984) (noting that 147,000 of Texas 
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 67. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
 68. Id. at 228. 
 69. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 219. 
 72. Id. at 224. 
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aliens as a class.75  The dissent emphasized that the judiciary should defer to 
the legislature on matters involving the allocation of state resources, especially 
within the state-run education system.76  Chief Justice Burger suggested that 
the Court in Plyler, as “noble and compassionate” as its motives may be, 
abused the Fourteenth Amendment to become an “omnipotent and omniscient 
problem solver.”77  The dissent concluded that, “the solution to this seemingly 
intractable problem is to defer to the political processes, unpalatable as that 
may be to some.”78 
b. Plyler’s Progeny 
Since Plyler in 1982, few cases have involved equal protection of 
undocumented aliens.  In 1994, California voters passed a ballot initiative 
prohibiting persons unlawfully admitted to the United States from receiving 
state services.79  The stated purpose of Proposition 187 was to provide 
“cooperation between agencies of state and local government with the federal 
government, and to establish a system of required notification by and between 
such agencies to prevent illegal aliens from receiving benefits or public 
services in the State of California.”80  Constitutional law professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky hypothesized that Proposition 187 would give the Supreme Court 
a chance to reconsider Plyler, commenting that under Plyler the Proposition 
187’s denial of education to undocumented immigrants was clearly 
unconstitutional and that denial of all government services—such as welfare 
and medical care—to undocumented immigrants was likely to be found 
unconstitutional.81 
However, the question of constitutionality of Proposition 187 prohibitions 
never came before the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Central 
District of California granted injunctive relief to bar California’s Governor and 
attorney general from enforcing the provisions.  While pending review in the 
Ninth Circuit, the parties settled.  The settlement permanently enjoined 
California from implementing and enforcing the measures set forth in 
California Proposition 187. 
More recently, cases brought on behalf of undocumented aliens in both 
Georgia and New York challenged the constitutionality of state efforts to 
restrict the issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants (Driver’s 
 
 75. Id. at 252–53 (Burger, C.J, dissenting). 
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License Cases).82  In Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Department of Public Safety, the 
Northern District of Georgia held that Georgia’s law prohibiting the 
Department of Public Safety from issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented 
and non-resident aliens did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the 
constitutional right to travel.83  The Georgia court looked to Plyler to provide a 
framework for its analysis, commenting that the Court found that “illegal 
aliens” are not a suspect class and relying on the Court’s language to draw a 
distinction between undocumented immigrant children and adults.84  The Doe 
No. 1 Court examined its own case law and pointed out that “[u]nlike most of 
the classifications we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by 
virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.”85 
In Alaska v. Cosio, the Supreme Court of Alaska upheld a regulation 
promulgated by the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Revenue that 
excluded undocumented immigrants residing in Alaska from eligibility to 
receive dividends that were distributed from the state’s permanent fund.86  The 
court relied on Plyler to determine what level of scrutiny the Alaska statue 
warranted.87  After examining the language of Plyler, the Cosio court found 
that the United States Supreme Court employed an “intermediate level of 
scrutiny” in which it reviewed the law under a “rational basis test,” but 
required the State to “produce a ‘substantial,’ as opposed to merely ‘legitimate’ 
state interest.”88 
The Cosio court pointed out two reasons that support the Plyler Court’s 
decision to impose intermediate scrutiny to the class of illegal aliens: (1) The 
Texas law at issue affected the “discrete class of children not accountable for 
their disabling status,” and (2) the Texas law denied children a basic 
education.89  The court then distinguished the Alaska regulation based on those 
two reasons, pointing out that the Cosios are both adults and that the right to 
dividend is a “matter of grace,” a governmental benefit distinguishable from 
social welfare.90  Thus, the court concluded that the Alaska dividend eligibility 
requirement only warranted rational basis review.  As expected, under a 
rational basis standard, the court found that the state’s regulation which 
excluded illegal aliens from receiving dividends from the permanent fund was 
 
 82. Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001); 
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rationally related to a legitimate state interest because it: (1) provided a 
mechanism for equitable distribution of the dividend to its residents, 
commenting that “giving dividends to illegal aliens would contravene public 
policy by rewarding individuals for illegal acts”; (2) encouraged persons to 
maintain residence in Alaska; and  (3) encouraged civic involvement and 
awareness in the management and expenditure of the fund.91 
In conclusion, Plyler drew a distinction in the level of judicial scrutiny 
used to  classifications based on “documented alienage” versus classifications 
based on “undocumented alienage,” noting that undocumented status was not a 
“constitutional irrelevancy.”92  The Plyler Court did not treat the class of 
undocumented immigrants as a “suspect class,” but applied an intermediate 
scrutiny standard in reviewing sub-federal action that adversely affected the 
rights of undocumented aliens.93  Absent clear judicial discouragement of such 
classifications and in response to social pressures and economic 
misconceptions, local governments, Jeffrey Whitteaker and his contemporary 
local leaders, have taken it upon themselves to promulgate local ordinances 
that address the “illegal immigration” problem.  In the Summer of 2006, 
aggressive local legislation sprang up in pockets of this country and included 
broad provisions that arguably violate the constitutional mandate of equal 
protection of the law set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Valley Park’s “illegal immigration” ordinance, and other local ordinances 
similar to it, may provide an opportunity for the Court to re-consider its 
decision in Plyler v. Doe.  Relying on the Court’s reasoning in cases examining 
classifications based on “documented” alienage and on Court’s analysis in 
Plyler, this Comment urges the Court to carefully scrutinize the local 
ordinances.  Because undocumented immigrants make up a discrete and insular 
minority and have been the subject of historical discrimination, they, like 
documented aliens, should be treated as a suspect class.  Moreover, local 
“illegal immigration” ordinances affect important rights, encroaching on non-
English speaking residents’ right to free speech and denying undocumented 
immigrants access to housing and basic services.  Thus, this Comment argues 
that the Court should employ strict scrutiny if and when it reviews local 
“illegal immigration” ordinances.  Finally, under an equal protection 
framework of analysis, this Comment suggests that Valley Park, and 
presumably other state and local governments, will fail to identify a 
compelling state interest that such legislation furthers. 
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A. Threshold Issue: Scope of the Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides “no 
person” shall be denied equal protection of the law.94  Unlike the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause also set forth in Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause does not employ the word “citizen” 
to describe the subjects of its general protections.95  Notably, the word 
“person” is not limited by any language that would indicate that a “person” 
must be legally present within the United States in order to avail herself of her 
right to equal protection of the laws.  In Plyler, the Court affirmed this textual 
interpretation of the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, referencing 
precedent that had extended due process and equal protection rights to all 
persons, regardless of their immigration status.96  Thus, a textual interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause indicates that undocumented aliens residing in 
the United States may avail themselves of its protections. 
B. State and Local Legislative Classifications That Discriminate Based on 
Alienage, Whether Documented or Undocumented, Should Be Subject To 
Strict Scrutiny 
The primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect African 
Americans against the harms of racial prejudice that had plagued the United 
States since its inception.97  However, we also know that the drafters of the 
Amendment chose to use general language not tied to race as a means of 
expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.98  Legislative 
classifications based on race present the “core case” of discriminatory 
classification that warrant strict judicial scrutiny in equal protection.99  
However, the general language of the Equal Protection Clause allows other 
groups to vindicate their right to equality under the law.100  The Court has 
identified many justifications for its heightened review of discriminatory 
classifications.  In the case of classifications based on alienage, the Court 
relied on an important rationale for applying a strict standard of review: aliens 
are a discrete and insular minority that is politically powerless.101  Moreover, 
the Court’s jurisprudence, including its rationale in cases like Yick Wo and 
 
 94. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
 95. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 96. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 214, n.13. 
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Takahashi, emphasizes that a history of discrimination against a particular 
group may indicate that a legislative classification, even if facially neutral, may 
be based on stereotypes or prejudices.102  In Plyler, the Court focused on the 
vulnerability of the children of undocumented immigrants affected by state 
discriminatory action and the importance of the right to education.  At times 
the Court has emphasized immutability of the trait upon which the class is 
drawn as a reason to scrutinize the discriminatory classification.103 
With these justifications in mind, this Comment argues that state and local 
legislation that discriminates on the basis of undocumented status should be 
subject to close and searching judicial scrutiny. 
a. Alienated from the Political Process: Undocumented Aliens, a 
Discrete and Insular Minority 
In Carolene Products’ celebrated footnote four, Justice Stone suggested 
that, although the Court would presume the constitutionality of most 
legislation, there are three instances where heightened judicial scrutiny may be 
necessary under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.104  In 
the third of these three instances, proposed in the final paragraph of the 
footnote, Justice Stone noted that legislation affecting the rights of a “discrete 
and insular” minority demanded “more searching judicial inquiry.”105  Justice 
Stone reasoned that the special condition of such discrete and insular groups 
“tends to seriously curtail the operation of the political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities.”  Professor John Hart Ely described 
Carolene Products footnote four as a blueprint for much of the Warren Court’s 
constitutional analysis.106  The role of the judicial branch is to protect against 
the legislature’s tendency to want to separate the “rulers from the ruled.”107  
Ely noted that important Warren Court decisions “insisting on equal treatment 
for society’s habitually unequals: notably, racial minorities, but also, aliens, 
‘illegitimates,’ and poor people,”108 implicitly accepting Justice Stone’s 
mandate for heightened judicial scrutiny when legislation adversely affects the 
rights of those whom the political process fails to protect. 
Identification of documented aliens as a discrete and insular group was an 
important rationale in the Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating 
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the constitutionality of state legislation that discriminated based on alienage.  
In Graham v. Richardson, the Court cited Carolene Products’ footnote four 
and described “documented” aliens as a “prime example of a ‘discrete and 
insular’ minority” because they enjoyed no right to vote.109  Similarly, 
undocumented aliens are excluded from the political process.  As Justice 
Brennan described in Plyler, undocumented aliens are America’s “shadow 
population.”110 As in 1982, the estimated number of undocumented immigrants 
residing in the United States today is well into the millions people.111  Each of 
these millions of persons resides in the United States and is subject to federal, 
state and local law, but cannot protect herself via the political process.  
Because aliens enjoy no right to vote, the political process is unlikely to protect 
aliens’ interest, documented or undocumented.  Because of their insular 
condition and exclusion from the polls, undocumented aliens find it difficult to 
create political alliances to affect governmental change.  Although the social, 
cultural or familial relationships of undocumented aliens may align their 
interests with the those of documented aliens, they gain little political clout by 
allying with another disenfranchised group. 
Moreover, the majority of America’s undocumented immigrants come 
from Latin America, Africa and Asia.  Thus, undocumented immigrants are 
likely to be racial minorities as well as newcomers.  Racial minorities and non-
residents are paradigmatically powerless classes.112  Because of their 
vulnerability and inability to vote, undocumented immigrants are ideal 
scapegoats for the political, economic and social woes of our Nation.  As racial 
minorities and newcomers, undocumented immigrants encounter a double 
barrier to entry in the political process, making them extremely vulnerable to 
the will of the majority and thus, a prime example of a discrete and insular 
class which careful and exacting judicial review should protect. 
b. Cloak of Constitutionality: Remembering Justice Murphy, An On-
going History of Anti-Immigrant and Racial Animus 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s primary purpose was to protect 
African Americans, the Court has emphasized that a history of discrimination 
against a class of persons makes it likely that the classification will be based on 
stereotypes and prejudices.113  Thus, a classification that adversely affects the 
rights of a group that has historically been the subject of discrimination is 
likely to warrant the most exacting standard of judicial scrutiny.114  In cases 
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decided in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like Yick Wo, 
Korematsu, and Takashaki, the Court seemed to take anti-immigrant sentiment 
into account as it considered the constitutionality of state action that affected 
the rights of resident aliens.  Justice Murphy in his concurrence in Takashaki 
and in his dissent in Korematsu warned against the “winds of racial animus” 
that state and local discrimination attempted to “cloak in the constitutionality” 
of classifications based on alienage.115  The Court in Plyler seemed to overlook 
the anti-discrimination and nativist principles that are at the heart of the 
alienage cases that have traditionally protected the noncitizens at the sub-
federal level. 
The Court in Plyler made no mention of racist or anti-immigrant sentiment 
as a motivating force behind the state law that denied undocumented 
immigrant children access to public education.  Twenty-four years after Plyler, 
the Court’s message that state laws like Texas’s violated Equal Protection 
failed to deter state and local officials in towns like Valley Park.  I do not 
presume to assert that the Court should have included such reasoning in its 
decision to employ an intermediate standard in Plyler, but rather, what I do 
suggest is that anti-immigrant and racist sentiments cannot be ignored if and 
when the Court considers ordinances such as Valley Park’s.  The local 
ordinances include preambles that indict immigrants for a host of social ills 
without substantiation.  Moreover, the measures that local “illegal 
immigration” ordinances set forth are far more aggressive than the Texas 
statute at issue in Plyler.  As the Court suggested in Yick Wo, local ordinances 
that create legislative classifications based on “hostility to the race and 
nationality” and tend be implemented with “an evil eye and an unequal hand” 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116 
The non-recognition of discrimination based on nativism obscures current 
and historical patterns of discrimination directed against Latinos and other 
recent immigrants, who belong to racial minorities.  Michael Wishnie, 
Assistant Professor of Clinical Law at New York University,  suggests the 
Court should be particularly concerned about anti-immigration discrimination 
at the state and local level because local anti-foreign movements have an 
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extensive history.117  Nativism has been one of the most sustained social 
movements in the U.S., spanning more than 150 years.118 
Racial prejudice or economic protectionism often motivate anti-immigrant 
legislation.119  Historically, economic and labor concerns have strongly 
influenced the strength of nativist sentiment expressed in American political 
discourse.120  Rene Galindo and Jami Vigil have observed that “[n]ativism 
becomes especially rampant during times of national stress and fear, and in 
times of war, economic recession, or demographic shifts stemming from 
unwanted immigration.” 121  Galindo and Vigil suspect that restrictive local 
legislation may be a response to these nativist fears, a threat to what they 
identify as the “core culture.”122  In the wake of 9/11, fears of “foreign” attack 
on American soil and American economy generated a new wave of anti-
immigrant sentiment.  Drawing attention to nativism as a term, ideology, and 
political practice will make visible previous and current patterns of prejudice 
and discrimination directed against immigrants. 
While racism and nativism are two distinct ideas, they are inexorably 
linked when discussing modern American anti-immigrant attitudes.  Racism 
and nativism overlap in complex ways.  The racial and ethnic makeup of the 
current immigrants to the United States has increased the volatility and 
sometimes vitriolic discourse of the immigration debate.  Classifications based 
on immigration status may be more likely to reflect racial prejudice than 
nativism.  Unlike the European immigrants who were targets of nativism at the 
turn of the century, the nativism directed against a group of immigrants who 
are predominantly “people of color” from Latin America and other non-
Eurporean countries.123  The race and ethnicity of these recent immigrants 
illuminates the complicated collision of socio-political phenomena that fosters 
powerful modern nativism, “an intersection of racism and defensive 
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nationalism.”124  As Professor Gerald L. Neuman has observed, “[t]he 
campaign for ‘Control Our Borders’ is partly a struggle for the future racial, 
linguistic and cultural development of American society.”125 
Pervasive forms of discrimination mark a long history of Latino, especially 
Mexican, immigration to the United States.126  Events such as “Operation 
Wetback,” the Zoot Suit Riot, and the struggle for the rights of the migrant 
farm workers in the American West illustrate the turbulent history of the 
Latino immigrant in the United States.  Richard Delgado argues that American 
society has often treated Latinos as “undesirable, unwholesome, and foreign,” 
and many times these discriminatory attitudes influence U.S. immigration 
policy and nationalist discourse.127 
Many opponents to the Valley Park ordinance alleged that the real 
motivation for the ordinance is racial animus towards Latinos.128  Reports 
indicate that the ordinance has driven foreign looking and foreign sounding 
residents out of Valley Park.129  Hector Molina described Valley Park’s “illegal 
immigration” ordinance as an effort to “keep all the brown people out” and to 
“villianize the Hispanic population” of the small municipality.130  The 
preamble to the ordinance indicts illegal immigrants for a host of social ills.  It 
provides: “illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, contributes to 
overcrowded classrooms and failing schools, and destroys our neighborhoods 
and diminishes our overall quality of life . . . .”131  Prior to the enactment of the 
ordinance, there is no evidence that any of the city officials engaged in 
investigation or research to identify the effects of illegal immigration on crime 
rates, educational opportunities, neighborhoods or quality of life.132  In 
statements to the media, Mayor Whitteaker explained the ordinances as 
“preventative maintenance,” a means of “protecting [his] community” against 
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the perceived threat of “illegal immigration.”133  City officials admitted that 
they had no knowledge as to whether “illegal immigrants” resided in Valley 
Park.134 
Moreover, the Valley Park “illegal immigration” ordinance’s vague 
language and enforcement mechanisms of the local ordinances invite racial 
profiling and implicitly promote employment and housing decisions based on 
invidious stereotypes and social prejudice.  Local police rapidly began 
enforcing the provisions of the ordinance, attempting to identify “illegal 
immigrants,” a complicated and technical charge.  Community residents report 
that in the days after the ordinance took effect in Valley Park, anyone who 
appeared Hispanic had to be prepared to present their “papers.”135  Because the 
vague language of Valley Park’s ordinance, and other local ordinances like it, 
fails to set forth definitions of “illegal immigrant” and fails to provide for 
training of local enforcement officials in to aid in identifying immigration 
status and interpreting immigration documents, it implicitly encourages racial 
profiling as an efficient way to enforce its regulations.136 
Furthermore, the Valley Park ordinance forces landlords and business 
owners to evaluate the immigration status of their tenants and employees 
without providing the tools necessary to identify immigration documents.  The 
“illegal immigration” ordinance gives members of the local community a legal 
guise under which they may take it upon themselves to be the immigration 
officials, allowing anti-immigrant and racial stereotypes to masquerade as law-
abiding behavior.  Under these circumstances, a reasonable, yet uninformed, 
landlord in Valley Park may refuse to rent housing to a family with a Latino 
surname because he does not have the tools to decipher whether the renters’ 
“papers” are valid and because the he would rather refuse the potential tenant 
than bear the risk of $500 municipal fine.  Similarly, a reasonable Valley Park 
employer may refuse to hire a woman who speaks English with an accent 
because the employer was not equipped with the technology to decipher if her 
social security card was valid.  Faced with the penalties set forth in Valley 
Park’s ordinance, the employer may prefer to hire another candidate than to 
bear the risk of losing his business permit in addition to a $1,000 municipal 
fine. 
This difficult intersection of racist and anti-immigrant animus surrounding 
the adoption of Valley Park’s ordinance and the harsh, unfounded language 
employed in the preamble beg the question: Is the “disadvantage imposed born 
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of animosity toward the class of persons affected?”137  The Court needs to send 
a clear and convincing message to state and local legislature, and to the nation, 
that such nativist and arguably racist legislation is intolerable and cannot mask 
itself in the cloak of constitutionality by labeling the victims of discrimination, 
“illegals.”  A history of discrimination based on race and immigrant status is 
yet another reason that the Court should analyze the Valley Park “illegal 
immigration” ordinance, and ordinances similar to it, under a standard of strict 
scrutiny. 
c. A Response to the Immutability Critique 
A common critique of a heightened scrutiny standard of judicial review of 
state and local law that discriminates against undocumented alienage is that 
illegal status is not an immutable characteristic like race or gender.138  And, 
like prisoners, undocumented aliens are law-breakers by choice, and thus, do 
not demand special judicial protection when legal classifications adversely 
affect their rights. 
However, the immutable characteristic rationale in equal protection 
analysis is especially tenuous.  First, many groups where membership is the 
result of a voluntary decision are treated as “suspect classes.”  For example, 
which religion one chooses to practice is not an immutable characteristic, but it 
is well-established that laws that discriminate against religious minorities are 
subject to strict scrutiny.139  Similarly, documented aliens become residents of 
this country ostensibly by choice, and yet, laws that discriminate against them 
as a class are also subject to strict scrutiny.  Conversely, many classifications 
based on immutable characteristics are not subject to strict scrutiny.  For 
example, classifications based on age are reviewed under a rational basis 
standard.140 
Secondly, as the Court emphasized in Plyler not all undocumented aliens 
are illegally present by choice.141  Many families migrate together, and thus, 
the class of undocumented aliens includes many minor children who are 
present illegally in the United States as a result of their parents decision.  Their 
membership in the class is as voluntary as a child’s choice to join the class 
comprised of “illegitimate children.”142  State and local legislation that denies 
undocumented immigrants access to housing and basic services as a class 
inevitably adversely affect the rights of children that are a members of that 
class, not by choice, but as a consequence of their parents’ decisions. 
 
 137. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S 620, 628 (1996). 
 138. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 551. 
 139. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 140. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 551. 
 141. Plyler, 432 U.S. at 202. 
 142. Id. at  238 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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According to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and other’s critique, U.S. 
residency, either documented or undocumented is a choice, and thus, the Court 
should review governmental classification based on alienage employing a 
rational basis standard.  The argument is: If aliens want to avoid state or local 
discrimination, they may simply move, alienage is mutable.  This argument 
fails to recognize that all U.S. residency is presumably a choice, and, any U.S. 
resident, citizen and alien alike, who feels violated by a government 
discrimination could move out of the jurisdiction of the governmental body 
whose action adversely affects his rights. 
2. Marshall’s Focus: the Importance of the Right that is Adversely 
Affected 
In reasoning that heightened scrutiny was necessary in Plyler, the Court, 
and especially Justice Marshall in concurrence, focused on the constitutional 
and social importance of the “right” which the Texas statute adversely 
affected.143  The Court emphasized the importance of the “right” to elementary 
public education and disparaged the specter of creating a permanent 
“underclass” by depriving undocumented alien children of that important, 
perhaps not fundamental, “right.”144  Accordingly, the Driver’s License Cases 
distinguished Plyler when they pointed out that the right to have a state 
driver’s license was not an important right like the right to education, and thus, 
denial of a driver’s license did not warrant heightened scrutiny.145 
When and if the Court considers Valley Park’s and other similar “illegal 
immigration” ordinances, the difficult, and in many respects unanswered, 
question is: which values qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental to be 
vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by legislative acts?146  
This section suggests that the “right”147 to education and housing, the First 
Amendment right to free speech, and the right to equal access to police 
protection are important, inalienable rights, which should be protected by the 
judiciary in its exercise of exacting judicial review. 
 
 143. Id. at 218 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See infra Part I.B.2b. 
 146. ELY, supra note 98, at 43 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 55 (1962)); See REDLICH, ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 855, 
commenting that in the 1960s and 1970s the Court moved toward Equal Protection analysis that 
afforded special protection to “fundamental rights,” including the right to education.  However, 
this line of fundamental-rights reasoning seems to have been largely dormant for many years. 
 147. Although the Court has not consistently recognized a fundamental right to free public 
education, it has focused on the importance of education in both Plyler and San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez.  Thus, this section will discuss an important “right” to education without suggesting 
that the Court would define the right as “fundamental.” 
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a. Right to Education and Housing 
The Valley Park ordinance adversely affects a number of important, if not 
fundamental, rights.  The Plyler Court’s concerns are again brought to bear; if 
no undocumented immigrant may rent or lease property in Valley Park, 
children of undocumented immigrants will be denied access to housing in 
Valley Park and thus, excluded from Valley Park public schools.  As the Court 
suggested in Plyler, because the Valley Park and other similar ordinances, 
deny undocumented immigrants access to housing and education, they present 
the specter of creating a permanent, uneducated and transient underclass. 
Furthermore, a person’s right to the “necessities of life,” to non-emergency 
health care and to adequate housing may be on par with the level of importance 
the Plyer Court placed on education.148  The lack of adequate housing, health 
care and basic services contributes to the creation of an impoverished 
underclass.  Valley Park and other “illegal immigration” ordinances affect a 
wide range of rights from obtaining housing and basic services, whether 
offered by the state or by a private resident or business, to speaking Spanish at 
city meetings or at work. 
b. First Amendment Right to Free Speech 
Section Four of the Valley Park Ordinance requires that “all official city 
business, forms documents, signage, telecommunication or electronic 
communication devices will be conducted or written in or utilize English 
only.”149  This “English Only” provision of the ordinance impinges on the 
fundamental right to free of speech, of all non-English speaking Valley Park 
residents, not just the rights of the residents who the ordinance defines as 
“illegal immigrants.”150 Generally, “English Only” laws, which declare English 
to be the government’s official language and bar government employees from 
providing non-English language assistance and services, are inconsistent with 
both the First Amendment right to communicate with or petition the 
government and with the Equal Protection Clause.151 
 
 148. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).  The Court struck 
down an Arizona statute that required an indigent to establish residency in the county before 
receiving non-emergency treatment in a public hospital.  Characterizing the residency 
requirement as a penalty on the right to migrate, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard and 
found that Arizona failed to set forth a compelling state interest.  Id. at 261. 
 149. VALLEY PARK, MO.,  Ordinance No. 1708, available at: http://www.valleyparkmo.org/ 
docs/ordinance%201708.pdf 
 150. Ruiz v. Hall, 957 P.2d 984 (1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
 151. Ruiz, 957 P.2d 954; see also, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 
(1997) (declaring suit out of the Ninth Circuit moot and never addressing the merits of state 
employee‘s claim that English Only amendment to the Arizona constitution was overly broad and 
violated the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution). 
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In Ruiz v. Hull, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a state constitutional 
amendment that required state and local governmental agencies to act only in 
English was unconstitutional, violating both the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause.152  In the court’s view, the state constitutional 
amendment violated the First Amendment because it impinged on the 
constitutional rights of non-English speakers who sought to obtain access to 
their state and local governments and limited the political speech of elected 
officials and public employees.153  The court found that the amendment also 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by burdening the core First Amendment 
rights of a specific class without advancing materially a legitimate state 
interest.154  Consequently, strict scrutiny applied, and the state’s desire to 
promote a common language was not sufficiently compelling to justify the 
prohibition of protected speech.155  The state can promote English without 
prohibiting the use of other languages by state and local governments.156  Thus, 
the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the trial court, and held that the state 
constitutional amendment was unconstitutional. 
Like the Arizona amendment, the language of Valley Park’s ordinance is 
overly broad and unconstitutionally vague, and thus, in violation of the First 
Amendment.  It would prevent a city employee from speaking any language 
other than English in any communication relating to her employment 
responsibilities.  The ordinance fails to set forth exceptions to the “English 
Only” provision for emergency services, access to municipal courts or town 
meetings.157 
In addition to its violation of the First Amendment, the “English Only” 
provision of the “illegal immigration” ordinance is dangerous to both 
individuals and the public.158  A Valley Park resident, notwithstanding his 
immigration status, would be in violation of the ordinance when he requests to 
file a complaint against a city employee in Spanish or defends against a traffic 
ticket in municipal court while speaking through a translator, notwithstanding 
 
 152. Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 987. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 987, 991. 
 156. Id. (The court noted that unlike English-only provisions enacted in other states, this 
amendment specifically and broadly prohibited governmental employees from using a language 
other than English even when they communicated with people who had little or no knowledge of 
English. Therefore, the amendment was too broad, as it would prohibit a teacher from discussing 
a child's education with Spanish-speaking parents in Spanish, and it would also prohibit a town 
hall discussion between citizens and elected officials in Spanish. Contrary to the trial court’s 
decision, this amendment was not a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction). 
 157. Ordinance No. 1708, supra note 2. 
 158. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS- AN ACLU 
POSITION PAPER (2001), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/gen/11713pub20000908.html. 
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his inability to communicate and comprehend English.159  If a number of 
Valley Park’s residents are unable to access emergency services, important 
town meetings, or municipal courts, Valley Park’s safety and general 
community welfare are at risk.  Thus, Valley Park’s “illegal immigration” 
ordinance, and other state and local legislation that set forth “English Only” 
provisions, encroach on the First Amendment right to free speech of non-
English speaking residents and put the safety and welfare of the state or local 
community at risk, and accordingly, demand heightened judicial review.160 
3. Equal Access to Police Protection 
The chilling effect of local ordinances such as that of Valley Park 
continues to play out.  Notably, access to police protection is an especially 
pressing concern.  Enforcement of the “illegal immigration” ordinance burdens 
the limited fiscal and human resources of local police departments.  Hastily-
adopted local ordinances like Valley Park’s thrust local law enforcement 
officials into a dual role—police protector and immigration agent.  Such a dual 
role may force undocumented immigrants to choose between access to police 
services and the “pain of deportation.”161  In other words, crime victims would 
avail themselves of police protection only if they were willing to risk the 
penalty of deportation.  Additionally, crime witnesses may fear coming 
forward with information.162  Moreover, many undocumented immigrants are 
part of communities and families that consist of a combination of 
undocumented immigrants, legal permanent residents, individuals with 
temporary lawful status and U.S. citizens.163  Thus, entire families and 
communities, especially immigrant neighborhoods, may display an aversion 
 
 159. See Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal for 
Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 543 (2004). 
 160. See David Michael Miller, Assimilate Me. It’s As Easy As (Getting Rid Of) Uno, Dos, 
Tres, 74 UMKC L. REV. 455 (2005) (discussing the constitutionality and public policy effects of a 
bill proposed in Congress (H.R. 997, the English Unity Act of 2005) that would provide an 
“English Only” law at the federal level). 
 161. See Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and Neglect?: The 
LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1611, 1637 (2002). 
 162. The NOW Legal Defense Fund reports that fear of deportation is the most significant 
barrier in reporting domestic abuse of women. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien 
Removal Act of 2003 (H.R. 2671): Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, Border, Security, 
and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 181 (2003) (report submitted by 
Katherine Culliton, Legislative Staff Attorney, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (MALDEF) “MALDEF Opposes Using First Responders To Enforce Federal Civil 
Immigration Laws”). 
 163. Michael E. Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXED STATUS OF 
FAMILIES IN AN ERA OF REFORM (1999), http://www.urban.org/publications/409100.html. 
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for dealing with the police due to a fear that some residents may be subject to 
penalties as a result of their “illegal” status.164 
C. Colorable Compelling State Interests 
If Valley Park’s, or other local legislatures’, “illegal immigration” 
ordinance is to survive heightened judicial scrutiny, it must meet the burden 
imposed under strict scrutiny: it must produce evidence that the ordinance 
furthers a compelling state interest.  As Professor Ely has suggested, if 
“political officials have chosen to provide or protect X for some people 
(generally people like themselves), they had better make sure that everyone 
was being similarly accommodated or be prepared to explain pretty 
convincingly why not.”165  One can identify various colorable local interests 
that Valley Park officials have presented or are likely to present.166 
1. Preservation of Local Resources for Legal Residents 
First, as set forth in the text of the ordinance, Valley Park argues that 
deterring illegal immigration is within its police powers because it has an 
interest in protecting its citizens and its limited resources against an influx of 
“illegal” residents.  A state or local government has a valid interest in 
preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs, but a state cannot accomplish 
such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of residents.167  The 
text of the revised Valley Park ordinance relating to illegal immigration sets 
forth: “Illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to 
fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care, contributes to 
other burdens on public services, increasing their costs and diminishing their 
availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall qualify of life and 
provides concerns to the security and safety of the homeland.”168  Valley Park 
has failed to provide empirical evidence to support such broad allegations 
regarding the effect of illegal immigration on its community, or on other local 
 
 164. See generally Tiffany Walters Kleinhart, Note and Comment, Local and State 
Enforcement of Immigration Law: An Equal Protection Analysis, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 
1120–1122 (2006). 
 165. ELY, supra note 98, at 74. 
 166. MO. REV. STAT. § 79.110 (2000).  Pursuant to MO. REV. STAT. § 79.110, the City of 
Valley Park has police powers as delegated by the state.  Local governments have the power to 
enact only those ordinance “not repugnant to the constitution and laws of this state, and as such 
they shall deem expedient for the good government of the city, the preservation of peace and 
good order, the benefit of trade and commerce and the health of the inhabitants thereof . . . .” 
 167. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225; See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374–75 
(1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). 
 168. Ordinance No. 1715, available at http://www.valleyparkmo.org/docs/Ordinances/ 
ordinance1715.pdf 
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communities.169  Moreover, it appears that Valley Park officials merely copied 
the text of Hazelton, Pennsylvania’s ordinance without conducting any local 
economic or social research.  As evidence of this copycat drafting process, the 
Valley Park ordinance includes a provision that it wishes to relieve its hospitals 
of “fiscal hardship” and prevent them from providing “substandard care.”170  
Curiously, there are no hospitals in Valley Park.171 
Furthermore, even if Valley Park manages to provide empirical evidence 
of a negative impact of illegal immigration on the city fisc, Plyler held that 
local efforts to preserve resources for its legal residents was “insufficient” to 
justify discriminating against undocumented children. In other words, 
preservation of state resources in education, and presumably other state 
services, fails an intermediate scrutiny standard.172  Accordingly, Valley Park’s 
colorable interest in preserving local resources is not compelling, and thus, 
fails to meet the burden of heightened judicial scrutiny. 
2. Federal Government’s Failure to Enforce Immigration Law Forced 
Valley Park to Regulate 
In statements to the media, Valley Park has argued that because the federal 
government has failed to thwart the growth of the undocumented immigrant 
population in the United States, state and local regulation of immigration is 
necessary.173  Again, the Court addressed this state interest argument in 
Plyler.174  It noted that the federal government possesses the plenary power to 
regulate immigration and naturalization.  Moreover, Valley Park argues for a 
dangerous public policy precedent when it claims that state and local 
governments may intervene because the federal government has abdicated its 
responsibility to regulate.  The rule that Valley Park seems to suggest is: where 
a state or municipality subjectively decides that the federal government has 
failed to regulate an area under its purview, the state or local government may 
usurp the federal power.  The danger in Valley Park’s logic becomes obvious if 
the proposed rule is applied to Congress’s plenary power to declare war.175  
Certainly, Valley Park would not argue that it could usurp the power to declare 
 
 169. Complaint at 7, Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, supra note 6. 
 170. Ordinance No. 1715, supra note 168. 
 171. Complaint at 8, Reynolds, et al. v. City of Valley Park, supra note 6. 
 172. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226. 
 173. See 6:00 Nightly News (KMOV-CBS television broadcast Feb. 6, 2007) (quoting Mayor 
Jeffrey Whitteaker); See also, Scott Luach, Kobach touts viability of Bill in Missouri, DAILY 
RECORD (Kansas City, Mo.), Feb. 7, 2007 (quoting Kris Kobach, law professor from University 
of Missouri-Kansas City law school, who has agreed to represent the city of Valley Park in its 
defense of the ordinance); Allison Retka, Missouri’s Valley Park begins its defense in barring the 
hiring and renting to illegal immigrants, ST. LOUIS COUNTIAN, Oct. 27, 2006. 
 174. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. 
 175. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] ALIENATING THE UNALIENABLE 1345 
war if it determined that Congress had failed to protect the nation against a 
foreign threat. 
3. Encroachment in a Realm of Plenary Federal Power: A Note on 
Federal Preemption 
In Graham v. Richardson, as well as in Plyler, the Court pointed to the 
federal government’s plenary power to regulate immigration as an element in 
its decision to sharpen its scrutiny of state legislation that affected the rights of 
undocumented and documented aliens, respectively.176  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA)177 is generally understood to preempt178 most state or 
local immigration regulation, however, neither the language of the INA  nor 
the decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that “every state enactment which 
in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-
empted . . . .”179 
The Supreme Court held in DeCanas v.Bica, that where a state exercise its 
police powers to regulate matters that have some attenuated effect on 
immigration, “absent congressional action,” such state action does not 
constitute “an invalid state incursion on federal power.”180  Language in the 
 
 176. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. 
 177. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 12 (2004). 
 178. State law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI; 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 
(1981).  The  Supreme Court has explained that federal law may preempt state law expressly or 
impliedly.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).  Express preemption 
of state and local law occurs when “Congress has unmistakably . . . ordained that its enactments 
alone are to regulate . . . [and, thus] state laws regulating that subject must fall.”  Id. at 116 (citing 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).  Preemption may also 
occur when the scope of federal regulation makes it clear that Congress intended to preempt state 
or local action in a specific field or where state or local action directly conflicts with the federal 
regulatory scheme.  Id. at 98. 
 179. Memorandum from Jody Feder & Michael Garcia, Legislative Attorneys American Law 
Division, to Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, A Legal Analysis of Proposed City of Hazleton Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, 4 (June 29, 2006), available at Congressional Research 
Service, 
http://prldef.org/Civil/Hazelton/hazleton%20legal%20documents/Hazleton%20Memo.pdf. (citing 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (emphasis in original)) [hereinafter Feder & Garcia] 
 180. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354.  In De Canas v. Bica, the California Superior Court found 
that a California statute which prohibited an employer from knowingly employing an alien who 
was not lawfully present in the United States was unconstitutional because it was pre-empted 
under the Supremacy Clause.  Id. at 353.  However, upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
found that California had “sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal standards in 
imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have no 
federal right to employment within the country.”  Id. at 936 (emphasis added).  The Supreme 
Court further noted that "even if such local regulation has some purely speculative and indirect 
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INA indicates that the INA “does not preempt states and localities from 
independently regulating the employment of illegal aliens through licensing 
and similar laws.”181  Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find that federal 
immigration law preempts Valley Park from denying licenses to businesses, 
located within Valley Park, that employ “illegal aliens.”182 
Assuming arguendo that sub-federal regulation of certain conduct 
involving immigration is not conclusively preempted by the INA, some 
provisions of local “illegal immigration” ordinances “appear to raise 
significant federalism concerns, as they involve conduct that comes under the 
purview of federal immigration law.”183  Passing through the door that 
DeCanas left ajar and into the realm of local immigration matters, 
municipalities like Valley Park may argue that local “anti-immigrant” 
ordinances are consistent with federal measures that urge local enforcement.184  
In light of proposed legislation considered by Congress such as the CLEAR 
Act and the Attorney General’s mandate,185 local governments that promulgate 
“illegal immigration” ordinances may argue that their measures are consistent 
with a federal mandate.  However, inconsistent with Plyler and with the 
exception for employment measures set forth in the INA, Valley Park’s and 
other municipal immigration ordinances would impose measures that are 
inconsistent with the federal regulations set forth in the INA, and thus, 
encroach impermissibly upon federal regulations designed to deter illegal 
immigration.  Furthermore, the CLEAR Act and the Attorney General’s 
“inherent authority” theory, promote local enforcement of federal law, not the 
promulgation of local legislation regulating immigration.186 
In all circumstances, the manner and scope of Valley Park’s ordinance 
raises concerns related to constitutional structure of government regulation of 
immigration.  One factor the Court may consider in determining whether 
Valley Park’s “illegal immigration” ordinance impermissibly encroaches on 
federal power is to determine whether it “focuses directly upon . . . essentially 
local problems and is tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils.”187  
Section Two of the Valley Park ordinance imposes civil penalties on an entity 
or individual who “aids and abets” illegal aliens anywhere in the United States, 
rather than simply in the City of Valley Park.  Because of its express 
 
impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of 
immigration ...." Id.  Notably, issues of equal protection were not raised, nor discussed on appeal. 
 181. Feder & Garcia, supra note 179, at 4. 
 182. Id. at 6. 
 183. See id. at 3. 
 184. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 185. See supra Part I.A. 
 186. See generally Tiffany Walters Kleinart, Local Enforcement of Immigration Law: An 
Equal Protection Analysis, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103 (2006). 
 187. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357. 
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extraterritorial scope, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to combat local 
problems facing the residents of Valley Park, and attempts to address U.S. 
immigration violations nationwide.188  Thus, Valley Park’s “illegal 
immigration” ordinance would be preempted by federal immigration law. 
In sum, the proposed ordinance would arguably create a new immigration 
regulatory regime independent from the federal system.  In the absence of a 
direct congressional consent, state and local governments encroach on federal 
plenary power to regulate immigration when they implement such far-reaching 
immigration legislation.  Moreover, it is questionable that even with 
Congress’s express consent, states and local legislatures could implement a 
comprehensive scheme relating to immigration.189  As it reasoned in Graham 
and in the series of cases that established that classifications based on 
“documented” alienage, the Court should again employ a strict scrutiny 
standard and strike down state and local legislation, like Valley Park’s “illegal 
immigration” ordinance, that discriminates based on “undocumented alienage” 
and encroaches on the plenary federal power to regulate immigration and 
naturalization. 
CONCLUSION 
If and when residents of Valley Park and other municipalities challenge the 
constitutionality of local “illegal immigration” ordinances, the Court should 
exercise strict judicial scrutiny.  Undocumented immigrants, like 
“documented” immigrants, should be regarded as an inherently suspect class 
because they are excluded from the political processes and because they have 
historically been the target of racist and nativist policies.  The Court should 
stand up for undocumented aliens, in injury and injustice, and where they seek 
relief from discriminatory, sub-federal legislation.  Moreover, the Court should 
strictly scrutinize state and local “illegal immigration” ordinances because they 
deny undocumented immigrants and other discrete and insular minorities 
access to basic services and violate their right to education, free speech and 
equal access to police protection.  Finally, when subjected to strict scrutiny, 
Valley Park, and other local governments, are unlikely to provide a compelling 
state interest to justify their discriminatory legislative classification, and thus, 
the Court should find that Valley Park’s “illegal immigration” ordinance 
violates undocumented immigrants’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection of the law. 
While America is a nation of laws, it is also a nation of immigrants.  
Population growth, economic distress, nativist and racial overtones tend to 
 
 188. See Feder & Garcia, supra note 179, at 6. 
 189. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001); cf. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to 
Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997). 
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complicate today’s immigration dilemma.  The fundamental question has 
become what inequalities are tolerable under these circumstances?  Author 
Garry Willis writes, “[r]unning men out of town on a rail is at least as much 
American tradition as declaring unalienable rights.”190  For centuries, people 
have left their nations of origin fleeing racism and oppression, injustice, and 
have come to the United States—by sea, by land, by air—in search of freedom.  
We cannot turn our back on our immigrant history.  While our constitutional 
structure welcomes state experimentation, that experimentation has often times 
been the source of discriminatory policy.  If we allow local legislation to 
address the immigration dilemma facing our nation, we may be endorsing the 
creation of state and local laboratories of bigotry.191  We must avoid our 
tradition of running the “others” out of town, and instead, rely on the American 
tradition of tolerance and the full protection of unalienable rights to guide our 
policy. 
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